SEGMENT 1:

Jeffrey Schmidt, Competition Partner
Former Director of the Bureau of Competition, U.S. Federal Trade Commission ,
Linklaters, LLP

- The different standards under Section 13(b) for the FTC to obtain an injunction versus the standard
  applicable to the DOJ.
- The need for clarification of the unilateral effects section of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
- The Commission's recently announced NPR relating to changing its Part III rules could have a
  major impact on how merger challenges at the FTC are handled in the future.
- How has N-Data changed the Commission's interpretation of the limits of Section 5 liability when
  no antitrust violation is found?
- Is it appropriate to judge an agency's enforcement record based on the number of enforcement
  actions it takes. Does it make a difference whether those enforcement actions involve consents
  versus litigated actions?

SEGMENT 2:

Robert A. Skitol, Senior Partner; Member of the Board of Directors, American Antitrust Institute,
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

- AAI's Transition Report on Competition Policy:
   I. Comprehensive set of recommendations for strengthening all aspects of both public and private
      antitrust enforcement
   II. Need to develop structured and workable rule-of-reason standards
   III. Need to develop more robust law on dominant firms' refusals
   IV. Strengthen merger enforcement
   V. FTC should expand the uses of its unfair methods of competition authority under Section 5 of
      the FTC Act
   VI. Strengthen antitrust's core public institutions -- DOJ, FTC, States

SEGMENT 3:

Dr. Richard T. Rapp, Special Consultant,
National Economic Research Associates, Inc.

» Exuberant enforcement and its unintended consequences
   The economic consequence of Rambus and Ebay is a real threat to the industrial organization of
   R&D and to innovation. We should be relieved that innovation markets in mergers were largely
   headed off. Price discrimination and nonprice vertical restraints are both ambiguous in their
   welfare effects and should remain neglected.

» The Economics of Brooke Group and Trinko
   These decisions determine the future of U.S. antimonopoly enforcement and its limitations. The
   government’s role in monopolization cases should remain limited to the 21st century AT&T and
   Microsoft cases – precedent-setting and too big for private action.

» The Economic Agenda: Where does antitrust fit in?
   The credit crisis -- Health care reform -- Defects in the patent regime Antitrust has a role to play in
   the repair of each of these problems but the recommendation that more resources should go to
   government enforcement is mistaken.

SEGMENT 4:

Paul T. Denis, Partner, Co-Chair, Antitrust/Competition Group,
Dechert LLP

- Horizontal Merger Guidelines - No apparent need for change
- Non-Horizontal Mergers - We need some Guidelines here
- Potential Competition Mergers - Time to admit that this doctrine is dead